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Customarily, states agree not to spread propaganda hostile to the govern-
ments of friendly foreign countries.' Nevertheless, hostile or aggressive
messages crossing international borders continue to stir up controversy.
No country formally disputes the goal of eliminating propaganda which
incites to war or violence. The real and bitter disagreements concern the
proper regulations to be applied to the media in all its operations, and
particularly to those messages which do not incite violence but are never-
theless objectionable to the receiving country or to the country which is
the subject of the communication. 2 These are the disagreements which the
nations of the world have continued to address.
Two major periods are discernible in the history of propaganda regula-
tion: one before the United Nations was established and one after. The
pre-UN period is marked by the invention of communication forms which
made the propaganda problem sufficiently pressing for countries to initiate
formal negotiations. These efforts were unsuccessful; propaganda con-
tributed to and flourished during World War II. 3 After the war, and in light
of an even greater explosion in communications technology, -international
cooperation resumed. Still, the UN period has been marked by East-West
battles over the role of media, and by the less-developed nations' insist-
ence that they acquire a voice in world media.
This article traces international efforts to regulate propaganda through
the pre- and post-UN periods, charting its development from a rather
peripheral concern of international law to its important role in the current-
ly evolving law of international communication.
* Elizabeth A. Downey is a member of the class of 1984, University of Michigan Law
School.
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THE PRE-U.N. PERIOD
Until the end of the nineteenth century, propaganda was spread either in
print or by word of mouth. Although states often complained about these
forms of propaganda, 4 few attempted to regulate them. With the inven-
tion of radio and telegraph, however, nations became concerned about the
increased opportunities for transmitting hostile messages internationally.
At first, nations sought to protect themselves by establishing regulations
within the broader scope of treaties delineating the law of neutrality, 5 or
by inserting anti-propaganda provisions in their bilateral treaties of friend-
ship. 6 Later, they began to negotiate agreements dealing with international
communications exclusively. 7 Some of these agreements were motivated
by a desire to promote world peace, 8 while others were motivated by the
need for mutual protection. 9 All of them rested on uncertain foundations
of international custom and practice, and none resulted in world-wide
cooperation.
The obligation of states not to disseminate propaganda hostile to their
neighbors has been accepted as customary international law since the
French Revolution. 10 At the same time, states have continually violated
that law, 1 1 leaving the status of the international custom in confusion.
There has been less theoretical agreement-and just as much divergent
practice--concerning the responsibility of a state for private propaganda;
that is, for propaganda broadcast by its citizens to other countries. As early
as 1802, Napoleon, in a dispute with Great Britain, declared that as a
general maxim of international law states are bound to suppress private
propaganda against other states and to punish those who purvey it. Great
Britain rejected this view of international law 12 and has held to that
position ever since. 13 At the Paris Convention of 1856 France raised com-
plaints against Belgium, and Belgium responded by enacting laws which
made private activities directed against foreign governments punishable by
a fine. 14 Yet in the 1870s, when Bismark complained about the activities
of Catholic bishops in France and Belgium, both those countries denied
any governmental responsibility for the activities of the clergy. 15
Similar disagreements and disparities surfaced in the early twentieth
century. In the 1930s, Japan protested about China's government toleration
of propaganda. 16 Many other countries leveled similar complaints against
the United States. 17 The United States adhered to the position that its
government could not interfere with private propaganda activities; yet in
1933, it imputed responsibility to the Soviet Union for anti-American
propaganda circulated by private persons or groups. 18 The Soviet Union
denied responsibility for such actions. 19 Germany in the 1930s allowed
private propaganda against foreign countries, as did Czechoslovakia and
Great Britain. 20
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With international custom as to the public and private dissemination of
propaganda already in dispute or disregarded in the early twentieth cen-
tury, the propaganda problem was exacerbated by major improvements in
radio and telecommunications technologies. Messages could be sent direct-
ly to countries hundreds and thousands of miles away. Thus, to be effec-
tive, international attempts to regulate propaganda ought to have regulated
it at its source. But many of the technical agreements facilitating interna-
tional communications in the 1920s and 1930s contained only clauses
affirming the right of the receiving state to refuse to deliver messages
considered dangerous to the peace and security of the country. 21 That is,
they did not respond to the propaganda capabilities of the new technolo-
gies in any realistic way.
The very earliest approaches to the regulation of propaganda in the
twentieth century attempted to draw on the law of neutrality. 22 For exam-
ple, propaganda was included in the 1907 Convention Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons. 23 Several of its articles
required signatory states to limit and control propaganda activities in their
countries. 
24
In a few isolated instances shortly after World War I, nations were
willing to address propaganda regulation as a separate subject for treaty-
making, although they still relied on the law of neutrality. In 1922, the
Commission of Jurists met at The Hague specifically to formulate rules for
the control of radio in times of war. The rules were designed to protect the
operation of radio stations in neutral countries, U and they outlined the
duties of both belligerents and neutrals. The Reichs-Rund Funk-Gesell-
schaft Agreement of March, 1931 between Germany and Polskie Radio
regulated propaganda in peacetime. Under its provisions, the parties were
bound to take reasonable steps to prevent broadcasts prejudicial to the
spirit of cooperation and understanding. 26
In fact, it was more usual for nations to approach the problem of propa-
ganda during the 1920s and 1930s as a sub-topic appended to bilateral
treaties of friendship or non-aggression. As early as 1922, the Soviet Union
began inserting anti-propaganda articles in various of its bilateral agree-
ments. 27 Some of these Soviet agreements provided that aggression be-
tween the contracting states could not be excused, even by revolution or
international threats. 28 Others bound the contracting states not to spread
propaganda against each other and not to permit anyone in their territories
to spread such propaganda. 29 A few other countries also included anti-
propaganda pledges in their bilateral treaties of friendship and non-aggres-
sion. 30
The first multilateral effort to regulate peacetime propaganda came in
1936.31 The Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause
of Peace, drawn up under the sponsorship of the League of Nations, was
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the strongest anti-propaganda instrument written up to that time. Article
I stated:
The high contracting parties mutually undertake to prohibit, and if occasion
arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territo-
ries of any transmission which to the detriment of good international under-
standing is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to
acts incompatible with the internal order or the security of a territory of a
high contracting party. 32
Articles 1, 3, 33 and 5 34 specifically charged the signatory states with the
responsibility to control the content of broadcasts originating within their
borders, regardless of whether the transmissions were made by private or
public agents. The Soviet Union and other countries which either had a
government monopoly of the media or government-enforced regulation of
the press approved of these provisions. They should have been unaccepta-
ble, however, to countries which advocated governmental non-interfer-
ence in private broadcasting. Yet Great Britain, for one, signed the
Convention. The United States, of course, was not a member of the League
of Nations, and so was not a party to the Convention.
Twenty-eight states signed the Convention, 35 but many doubted that
the League of Nations could enforce it and many were anxious to retain
sovereignty over the flow of all information into and out of their territo-
ries. 36 Belgium and the Soviet Union reserved the right to retaliate against
propaganda by jamming broadcasts in the event that the procedures out-
lined in the Convention proved ineffective. 37 Spain went even further,
reserving the right to:
put a stop by all possible means to propaganda liable adversely to affect
internal order in Spain and involving a breach of the convention, in the event
of the procedure proposed by the convention not permitting of immediate
steps to put a stop to such breach. 38
The Soviet Union also declared its intention to apply the Convention only
on terms of reciprocity with other countries.
Despite these substantial reservations on the part of certain signatories,
the League of Nations was gratified to note that the Convention seemed
to inspire similar regional agreements in Latin America. 39 Indeed, a series
of inter-American agreements of the 1930s did encourage the use of broad-
casting to promote mutual understanding. 40 However, while the American
regional agreements of the 1930s were motivated by a desire for improved
mutual understanding, the communications agreements of the early 1940s
were inspired by a desire for mutual protection against the Axis Powers.
For example, at a 1942 meeting in Rio de Janiero, representatives of Ameri-
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can states adopted a resolution submitted by the United States calling for:
the closing of telecommunication links between the Americas and the Axis
Powers; the establishment of controls by licensing of facilities; the elimina-
tion of clandestine radio stations; and the prevention of "transmission and
reception of information, public or private, which might directly or in-
directly promote the purposes of the aggressor States, or of governments
subservient to them." 4 1 As with the executive orders authorizing govern-
mental control of radio stations at the beginning of World War 1, 42 the
United States demonstrated its willingness to limit the free flow of infor-
mation in time of war.
Except for these regional agreements among allies, international cooper-
ation on the subject of propaganda regulation collapsed during the war.
The League of Nations Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in
the Cause of Peace was ignored, and propaganda liberally fueled the hos-
tilities. It remained for the post-war world to resume the search for effec-
tive international telecommunications agreements.
THE U.N. PERIOD
The communications agreements drawn up under the auspices of the Unit-
ed Nations have been concluded only after extensive debate. As in the
pre-UN period, countries like the United States and the United Kingdom
would rely on the free flow of information to correct inaccuracies and
hostile propaganda, whereas the Soviet Union and its allies would confer
directly upon governments the responsibility for controlling the media.
The underdeveloped countries have not embraced either position in its
totality. Instead, they have been concerned with developing their own
media and correcting inaccurate reporits disseminated by. other states,
thereby injecting new concerns and controversies into the international
debates concerning communications.
East-West Differences
The UN Charter, drawn up in 1947, does not directly mention propaganda,
but UN authority over it may be implied under Article 39, which permits
the Security Council to deal with peace-threatening situations. 43 During
the initial sessions of the General Assembly, however, individual nations
requested the UN to address the propaganda issue expressly. 44 In re-
sponse, the Economic and Social Council sponsored an International Con-
ference on Freedom of Information at Geneva in 1948. Its task was to
study:
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measures for counteracting the persistent spreading of demonstrably false or
tendentious reports which confuse the peoples of the world, aggravate rela-
tions between nations, or otherwise interfere with the growth of internation-
al understanding, peace, and security against a recurrence of Nazi, Fascist or
Japanese aggression. 45
The United States and the United Kingdom wanted to draft a strong,
uncompromising "freedom-of-press" document, and tried to unite the
West against the East to achieve that end.
Generally, they succeeded. 46 The Draft Convention on Freedom of
Information, adopted by a majority at the Conference, affirmed freedom
of information as a fundamental human right, affirmed the right to listen,
and declared that no valid grounds other than military security existed for
peacetime censorship over the international transmission of news mate-
rial. 4
7
The Draft Convention departed from pre-war approaches to the regula-
tion of propaganda in several significant ways. In itself, its condemnation
of peacetime censorship, with an exception for reasons of military security,
was not new. As early as the 1920s, international agreements on the use
of the telephone and telegraph provided for the stoppage of communica-
tions considered dangerous to the security of the receiving state. 48 The
Draft Convention broke new ground, however, by framing the exception
strictly in terms of "military security," instead of the more widely-encom-
passing "state interest" or "national security." Thus the Draft Convention
narrowed the grounds for peacetime censorship considerably. What was
also new was that rather than couching the provisions in terms of neutral-
ity, 49 or mutual aid and protection, 50 or even protection of the public order
and promotion of mutual understanding, 51 the Draft Convention began
by recognizing the right to send and receive information as a human
right. 52 Overzealous censorship, like the overzealous regulation of propa-
ganda generally, has the obvious potential to restrict the exercise of these
two rights.
The Draft Convention was presented to the General Assembly in
1949.53 For the next eleven years it was the subject of formal study and
political debate in one UN organ after another. 
5 4
Article 1 provided:
The right to know and the right freely to seek the truth are inalienable and
fundamental rights of man. Everyone has the right, individually and collec-
tively, to seek, receive, and impart information.
A French amendment stressing the right of choice among different sources
of information, was adopted in conjunction with this Article. 55
Article 2 has been the focus of intense debate:
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All Governments should pursue policies under which the free flow of infor-
mation, within countries and across frontiers, will be protected. The right to
seek and transmit information should be assured in order to enable the public
to ascertain facts and appraise events.
Some countries had wanted to draft the article as precisely as possible, to
leave no doubts about what was required of the media of each country. 56
Others had objected to the article on the grounds that it limited the free
flow of information too much. 5 7
Other provisions of the final document required: sufficient freedom of
information to encourage diversity of sources of information and access of
the individual to those sources, 5 8 the development of independent nation-
al media of information; 5 9 the obligation to "strive in good faith to ensure
the accuracy of the facts reported and to respect the rights and the dignity"
of others; 60 and the prohibition of any limitation on freedom of informa-
tion other than those "determined by law solely for the purpose of secur-
ing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
to meeting the just requirements of national security, public order, morali-
ty, and the general welfare in a democratic society." 61
The Draft Convention on Freedom of Information was similar to some
of the earlier agreements, such as the Hague agreements of 1922, which
provided that war should not unnecessarily disturb the flow of informa-
tion. 6 2 The Convention encouraged Member States to take action to regu-
late propaganda, as did Article 3 of the International Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace (1936). 63 But
unlike the early agreements, the Convention declared the right to give and
receive information to be a fundamental human right, although that right
might be limited by national security concerns or the demands of public
order. 64 Although the Draft Convention was never ratified by the full
General Assembly, 65 it provided a new focus and direction for the ensuing
discussion of the Draft Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The Draft
Convention demonstrated that information, as a substantive issue of inter-
national law, had evolved from a purely political question to a question
of human rights.
Since information rights had thus been elevated in status, it was not
surprising that in 1962 the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
dealt with freedom of information in Article 19:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interfer-
ence.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
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ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in the foregoing paragraph
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore,
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as are
provided by law and are necessary, (1) for respect of the rights or
reputations of others, (2) for the protection of national security or
of public order ("ordre public"), or of public health or morals. 
66
Those countries, including the United States, which had been pleased with
the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, had no objections to
Article 19.67 Other countries, however, disapproved of paragraph three
because: (1) there was no prohibition of governmental interference by way
of censorship and prior restraint; (2) the article did not stipulate that
additional restrictions could be imposed by the courts or at least could be
reviewed by the courts; and (3) the article did not say that courts alone
have the power to impose penalties for violation of the article. 68 One
proposed amendment to Article 19 stated merely that everyone has the
right of free expression subject to only necessary restrictions. 69 Another
excluded war propaganda and racial discrimination as subjects of free
speech. 70 Ultimately, the Article was adopted as written. 71
While paragraph 3 of Article 19 ended up, therefore, with an extremely
abstract admonition against propagandistic communications, Article 26,
the other information-related Article of the Draft Covenant declared ille-
gal the publication or broadcasting of information constituting an incite-
ment to war or hatred. 72 By implication, it contemplated that such
communication should be restricted by each state. Although the United
States was sympathetic to the aim of not inciting violence, it refused to
support any article giving governments an excuse to limit free speech and
press. The proposed Article 26, the United States felt, would undermine
Article 19.73 The Soviets thought the article too weak because it did not
allow other justifications for the regulation of information. 74 They would
have preferred an article authorizing governmental regulation of any infor-
mation advocating discrimination or qualifying as propaganda. Still other
nations worried that "incitement to hatred" was too vague to be very
helpful. 75 In the end, Article 26 prohibited by law propaganda for war or
any advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility, or violence. 76
Given the inevitable tension between establishing rights to information
and recognizing legitimate state interests in suppressing propaganda, the
article was a good compromise. It did not, as the United States charged,
undermine Article 19. Instead, it supplemented paragraph 3 of Article 19,
which allowed restrictions necessary for special limited purposes. Al-
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though the United States did not favor any provision allowing governmen-
tal interference in speech, the restriction against incitement to war and
hatred could be viewed as safeguarding international welfare just as
domestic law provisions sometimes permit free speech to be curtailed for
the national welfare. Article 26 articulated the Soviet position that states
have a duty to halt propaganda originating in their territories, at least in
so far as that propaganda incites to violence or hatred. In this way, the
article reaffirmed the position taken in Articles 1, 3 and 5 of the 1936
Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. 77
The Conflict Between Developed and Less-developed Nations
The less developed, or underdeveloped, countries of the Third World do
not align themselves consistently with either side in the East-West con-
flicts. They often favor governmental regulation of communication, as
does the East, but seem to recognize some value in alternative sources of
information. 7
8
To understand their position, it is necessary to realize that these less-
developed nations are primarily concerned with their own economic,
political, and social development. As part of their pursuit of moderniza-
tion, they seek to develop an independent national media. 79 Until then,
they want some control over what is reported about them in the world
press. Thus the right of reply is a major issue for these countries. They feel
that if they are able, as a matter of legal right, to reply to false or misleading
information which has been disseminated about their countries, they will
be seen in a much more favorable light by the rest of the peoples of the
world.
Overall, then, the Third World countries seem to support two positions
with regard to the international regulation of propaganda. First, they argue
for an expanded definition: propaganda should not only be thought of as
purposefully misleading information whose dissemination is intended to
harm a nation or people, but can also result from technically accurate but
unbalanced or one-sided information that leads to an inaccurate, incom-
plete understanding. Second, they regard the right of correction as a critical
tool to thwart propaganda, particularly in the sense of its expanded defini-
tion, where the propagandistic material is not maliciously intended but
pernicious in its result.
The right of correction is not a new concept to the international effort
to control propaganda. As early as 1936, the International Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace undertook to
give a right of correction:
Article 3. The high contracting parties . . . further mutually undertake to
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ensure that any transmission likely to harm good international understand-
ing by incorrect statements shall be rectified at the earliest possible moment
by the most effective means, even if the incorrectness has become apparent
only after the broadcast has taken place. 80
None of the new Third World countries were parties to the Convention. 81
Still, they are able to point to the Convention as evidence that the right
of correction has been recognized in international law.
The problem has been addressed more extensively during the UN Peri-
od. At the 1948 Conference on Freedom of Information, the United States
offered a resolution on the "Right of Official Denial," by which a state
which thought that a foreign correspondent's report was false, distorted,
and likely to injure its relations with other states could issue its own
version of the facts. It would send that version to the state where the report
had been published and the receiving state would be obliged to make it
available to information agencies there. The receiving state would not be
obliged to have that version of the facts published, however. 82
The Soviet Union would not support the resolution, but not because the
controls were not strict enough. Rather, it considered the proposals an
unwarranted interference in domestic affairs. 83 This departure from the
usual Soviet preference for greater press restrictions may have been moti-
vated more by cold-war politics than by any strictly legal considerations.
On the other hand, it could merely have been a response typical of a
country which emerged from World War II with its media relatively un-
scathed.
In fact, it was primarily those countries with heavily damaged or still
undeveloped communications systems which supported the proposed
right of correction at the 1948 Conference. Certain eastern and western
European countries were concerned that America could dominate the post-
war world by means of its superior communications. 84 They feared that
the United States might not be sensitive to their needs since it did not fear
misrepresentation itself. And thus they sought alternatives to the "Right
of Official Denial" proposed by the United States which would more
effectively guarantee them the ability to express their views in their own
way. 85
The Draft Convention on the International Right of Correction, adopted
by the seventh session of the General Assembly in 1952,86 did provide for
a right of correction, and it required the Secretary General of the UN to
give such corrections publicly when the state responsible for the original
report did not. 87 Many of today's underdeveloped countries did not yet
exist in 1952, but their interests are identical to those countries which were
reconstructing or developing at that time.
In recent years, UNESCO has become one of the most active UN sources
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of discussion of issues in international communications, and the Third
World has played a particularly active role. It has adopted a series of
documents which collectively articulate a "New World Information Or-
der,"8 8 including the 1978 Declaration on Fundamental Principles Con-
cerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to
countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War. 89
Although the Declaration of Fundamental Principles does not specifical-
ly recall the Draft Convention on the International Right of Correction, it
is consistent with it to a certain extent. Article V provides that in order to
correct inequalities in the flow of information, countries which feel that
prejudicial information has been disseminated about them are entitled to
have their own views publicized.
The Declaration on Fundamental Principles reaffirms the positions of
earlier international agreements on the object of propaganda. Although the
word "propaganda" is never mentioned, Article III contains detailed allu-
sions to the concept:
In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of
human rights which are inter alia spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the
mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures
and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunder-
standing between peoples, to make nations of a country sensitive to the
needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity
of all nations, all peoples, and all individuals without distinction of race, sex,
language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils
which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby
promoting the formulation by States of the policies best able to promote the
reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement
of international disputes. 90
Considered in isolation, Article III is a vague exhortation to idealistic goals.
Article 111(2), however, must be read in light of the documents incorporated
into the Declaration. The Preamble specifically recalls Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Resolution 110(II) of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, adopted in 1947, condemning all forms
of propaganda which are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and Resolu-
tion 127(11), also adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, which invites
Member States to take measures, within the limits of constitutional proce-
dures, to combat the diffusion of false or distorted reports likely to injure
friendly relations between States. 91
Thus, while the origins of the concerns expressed in the Declaration on
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Fundamental Principles can be traced to the 1936 International Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, it also clearly
evidences the preoccupations of the Third World in the propaganda de-
bate. How this injection of a new voice into this long-standing debate will
shape the future contours of the debate remains to be seen.
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stations. Article 3 stated that the erection of a radio station on the territory of a neutral
country by a belligerent constituted a violation of neutrality. Article 4 stated that a neutral
state was not required to restrict or limit the operation of radio stations within its borders,
except when necessary to prevent information concerning military forces or operations from
reaching a belligerent. DeWolf, supra note 24, at 121-22.
26 Leroy, Treaty Regulation of International Radio and Short Wave Broadcasting, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
719, 728 (1938).
27 E.g., Supplementary Agreement to the German-Russian Agreement Concluded at
Rapallo, Nov. 5, 1922, Germany-U.S.S.R., art. 7, 26 L.N.T.S. 387, 394.
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28 E.g., Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 5, 1933, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., art.
3 Annex, 148 L.N.T.S. 79, 83. Impermissible justifications noted in the Annex include: the
political, economic or social structure of a state; alleged defects in its administration; the
violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State
or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; or economic or financial
boycotts. Accord Convention for the Definition of Aggression between Rumania, U.S.S.R.,
Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia, July 4, 1933, art. 3 Annex, 148 L.N.T.S. 211, 217;
Convention for the Definition of Aggression between Roumania, Poland, U.S.S.R., Afghanis-
tan, Persia, Latvia, Estonia, and Turkey, July 3, 1933, art. 3 Annex, 147 L.N.T.S. 67, 75.
29 One of the more famous of such agreements is the Litvinov Assignment between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Both countries promised not to spread propaganda hostile to the
government of the other country and not to harbor any groups working toward the overthrow
of the government of the other country. See Erchange of Communications between the President of the
United States and Maxim M. Litvinov People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 28 AM. J. rr'L L. Sops. 2 (1934); see also Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression,
June 24, 1931, Afghanistan-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 157 L.N.T.S. 367.
30 However, very few non-Soviet treaties containing propaganda articles were made
during this period. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Security, April 22, 1926, Persia-Turkey,
arts. IV & V, 107 L.N.T.S. 247, 263; Anti-War Treaty (Non-Aggression and Conciliation),
Oct. 10, 1933, art. III, 163 L.N.T.S. 393, 405. The latter treaty reads in pertinent part:
In case any of the States engaged in the dispute fails to comply with the obligation
set forth in the following Articles, the Contracting States undertake to make every
effort in their power for the maintenance of peace. To that end, and in their character
of neutrals, they shall adopt a common and solitary attitude; they shall exercise the
political, juridical or economic means authorized by International Law; they shall bring
the influence of public opinion to bear; but in no case shall they resort to intervention
either diplomatic or armed....
This treaty between South American states was unusual, because it appeared to allow a state
to use propaganda in order to publicize the wrongdoing to a signatory state. See also Additional
Treaty to the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, April 27, 1938,
Greece-Turkey, art. 3, 193 L.N.T.S. 175, 1979; Agreement regarding Questions of Mutual
Concern Consisting of a Protocol and Annexes, Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Italy, April
16, 1938, Annex 4, 195 L.N.T.S. 77, 86.
31 On September 24, 1931, the League of Nations Assembly asked the International
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation to study all international questions arising out of
broadcasting, with special attention on publicizing the goals of the League of Nations. The
Committee set up a meeting of experts to study the state of international communications
and the treaties purporting to regulate the field, especially the Reichs-Rund Funk-Gesell-
schaft Agreement. See supra text accompanying note 26. After completing an exhaustive study,
the experts drafted the Convention for the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, which
the League transmitted to member states for comment in 1934. Extracts from the General Report
of the Director of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation to the International Committee, 14 LEAGUE
OF NATIONS O.J. 1371, 1378 (1933); 15 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 109, 109-10 (1934).
32 International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,
supra note 8, at art. 1.
33 Article 3 states:
The high contracting parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to
stop without delay within their respective territories any transmission likely to harm
good international understanding by statements the incorrectness of which is or ought
to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast.
They further mutually undertake to ensure that any transmission likely to harm good
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international understanding by incorrect statements shall be rectified at the earliest
possible moment by the most effective means, even if the incorrectness has become
apparent only after the broadcast has taken place.
Id.
34 Article 5 states:
Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to place at the disposal of the other
high contracting parties, should they so request, any information that, in his opinion,
is of such a character as to facilitate the broadcasting, by the various broadcasting
services, of items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilization and the
conditions of life of his own country as well as of the conditions of life of his own
country as well as of the essential features of the development of his relations with
other peoples and of his contribution to the organization of peace.
Id.
35 The signatories were: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, France, Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Roumania, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Uruguay.
36 See infra note 80. Enforcement problems continue today. The 1978 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles, infra note 89, contains no real enforcement mechanism. Instead, a
conference was scheduled for 1983 to implement the Declaration. The inability to include an
effective enforcement mechanism in the Declaration itself may be symptomatic of the general
mistrust nations have toward United Nations enforcement of communications agreements.
37 International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,
supra note 8, at 314 n.1, 317 n.1.
38 Id. at 315 n.1.
39 International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, Report by Committee on the
Work of the 17th Plenary Session, League of Nations Doc. C.290/M154 (XII) (1935).
40 E.g., the Seventh International Conference of American States in Montevideo (1933),
and the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires (1936),
called for collective use of short wave frequencies for positive propaganda among American
states. LeRoy, supra note 26, at 728-29; see Inter-American Radiocommunications Convention,
April 17, 1939, reprinted in 35 AM. J. Irr'L L. SuPP. 56 (1941) (provided for cultural broadcasting);
North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, discussed in Otterman, Inter-American Radio
Conferences, Habana, 1937, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1938); see also Exchange of Notes Regarding
the Prohibition of Films Considered Disparaging, Sept. 4, 1935, and Jan. 18 and Feb. 18, 1936,
Spain-Chile, 169 L.N.T.S. 321; Exchange of Notes regarding the Prohibition of the Exhibition
of Films Considered as Disparaging, March 2 and 9, 1936, Peru-Spain, 169 L.N.T.S. 331;
Convention for the Revision of History and Geography Textbooks, Dec. 28, 1933, Brazil-
Mexico, art. I, 186 L.N.T.S. 399, 401. The latter treaty reads in pertinent part: "[The two
countries] shall arrange for the textbooks used for the teaching of national history in their
respective countries to be revised, and for all passages likely to arouse hostility in youthful
minds against any American nation tobe deleted."
41 Fenwick, The Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de laniero, 36 AM. J. INT'L L.
169, 188-189 (1942). The Rio conference followed a 1941 conference in Havana, in which
American states made a general pledge to take action against propaganda directed at the
Americas. Stowell, The Habana Conference and Inter-American Cooperation, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 123, 127
(1941).
42 See supra note 24.
43 "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
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shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security." U.N. CHARa art. 39.
44 E.g., Yugoslavia suggested that a proposal be added to the provisional agenda of the
Second Regular Session of the General Assembly in 1947 so the Assembly could address
"[r]ecommendations to be made with a view to preventing the dissemination with regard to
foreign states of slanderous reports which are harmful to good relations between states and
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Whitton, Efforts to Curb
Dangerous Propaganda, 41 AM. J. rr'L L. 899 (1947).
In 1946, during the first half of the first session of the General Assembly, the Philippines
proposed a world-wide conference on freedom of information. See Report of.Salvador Lopez
on Freedom of Information to the Economic and Social Council, 16 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.
12) at 7, U.N. Doc. E1426 (1953).
45 Whitton, supra note 44, at 901. The Conference was conducted by the Sub-Commission
on Freedom of Information of the Economic and Social Council. Report of Salvador P. Lopez,
supra note 44.
46 Although the Western nations as a whole supported the ideal of freedom of informa-
tion, some nations were more willing than others to moderate their positions. Britain submit-
ted a Draft Convention which affirmed freedom of information as a human right, but
subjected it to restrictions by law, including laws dealing with propaganda. See Whitton, The
United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and The Movement Against International Propaganda,
43 AM. J. IoT'L L. 73, 83 (1949). The U.S., however, opposed all ten proposed restrictions,
preferring to regulate the area through voluntary efforts and moral principles. Id. at 82-84.
Unlike the British, the Americans stood firmly, almost obstinately, for complete governmen-
tal non-interference in communications.
The East bloc nations, in turn, insisted upon the strict legal obligation of each state to
prevent publication of rumors designed to provoke war, and deplored the fact that the British
Draft contained no article prohibiting false or distorted news or propaganda. Id. at 76, 82-84.
They characterized the Western, and particularly the American position, as "hidden censor-
ship," and charged that the dedication to freedom of information was really a desire to
maintain the inequality in the flow of information in favor of the West and promote capitalist
propaganda. Id. at 76. Eventually, however, the British Draft Resolution was adopted.
47 U.N. Doc. A/5443 (1963). The text of relevant portions of the Convention is reprinted
infra note 58.
48 See supra note 21.
49 See Second Hague Convention of 1907, supra notes 23-24.
50 E.g., as in the inter-American agreements of the 1940's, supra text accompanying notes
41-42, and in the treaties of friendship and non-aggression, see supra text accompanying notes
27-30.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 for a discussion of the International Conven-
tion Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace; see also supra text accompanying
notes 39-40 for a discussion of the inter-American agreements in the 1930s.
52 Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 47, at art. 1.
53 The General Assembly began revising the Draft, but after encountering difficulties
decided to postpone consideration of it until more work could be finished on the Draft
Covenant on Human Rights. In 1951 the preamble and nineteen articles were redrafted by
an ad hoc committee, but the General Assembly did not discuss the draft. Report of Salvador
Lopez, supra note 44, at 8.
54 The Economic and Social Committee began debating the draft in 1954, basing its
discussion on an extensive report on freedom of information. See Lopez, Economic and Social
Council Discussion of Report of Rapporteur on Freedom of Information, 8 INT'L ORGAN. 366 (1954). The
debate was so protracted that the Social Committee of the General Assembly criticized
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ECOSOC in 1955 for an apparent lack of interest in freedom of information. Freedom of
Information Considered by the Social Committee of the General Assembly of the U.N., 9 Ilr'L ORGAN. 117,
121 (1955).
The resolution which was finally passed merely urged governments to cease censoring
outgoing news transmission, rather than dealing with the propaganda problem in any sys-
tematic way. Economic and Social Council discussion of Freedom of Information, 9 Ir'L ORGAN. 525 (1955).
In 1960, the Social Committee of the General Assembly discussed the Draft Convention with
better results, for it was in that Committee that the Draft Resolution evolved into its final
form. For a discussion of the Social Committee debates, see General Assembly Consideration of Draft
Convention on Freedom of Information, 14 INT'L ORGAN. 151 (1960).
55 See id.
56 See General Assembly Consideration of Draft Convention on Freedom of Information 15 hrr'L ORGAN.
121 (1961). For example, instead of just listing the allowable limitation on the free flow of
information, the Philippine draft expressly authorized nations to regulate information for
purposes of security, public safety, health and morals. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 878 (1960). Brazil,
Liberia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia collaborated on expanding the limitations in the Philippine
draft, and tried to refine the language. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.880 (1960). Eight Latin American
states sponsored an amendment prohibiting prior censorship; that amendment was revised
to read that there could be no censorship of news, comments, political opinions or use of such
evidence as grounds for restricting the right to criticize the government.
With these revisions, article 2 was adopted. For detailed reporting of the debate, see 15
INTL ORGAN. at 122-23.
57 For example, Uruguay, Sweden and Denmark objected to article 2. Denmark opposed
it on three specific grounds: (1) no clause of the article prohibited advance censorship; (2) the
article evaded the question of who was to make the decision that particular published
information was illegal; and (3) the limitation of article 2 applied only to the gathering and
receiving of data, which is a matter that can only be regulated by law to a limited extent.
See General Assembly Consideration of Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 56, at 122.
58 Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 47, at art. 3. Relevant portions
of the text of the Draft Convention read as follows:
Article I
The right to know and the right freely to seek the truth are inalienable and fundamental
rights of man. Everyone has the right, individually and collectively, to seek, receive and
impart information.
Article 2
All Governments should pursue policies under which the free flow of information, within
countries and across frontiers, will be protected. The right to seek and transmit information
should be assured in order to enable the public to ascertain facts and appraise events.
Article 3
Media of information should be employed in the service of the people. No Government
or public or private body or interests should exercise such control over media for disseminat-
ing information as to prevent the existence or a diversity of sources of information or to
deprive the individual of free access to such sources. The development of independent
national media of information should be encouraged.
Article 4
The exercise of these rights and freedoms entails special responsibilities and duties. Those
who disseminate information must strive in good faith to ensure the accuracy of the facts
reported and respect the rights and the dignity of nations, and of groups and individuals
without distinction as to race, nationality or creed.
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Article 5
The rights and freedoms proclaimed above should be universally recognized and respect-
ed, and may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. They should be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of national security, public order, morality and the general
welfare in a democratic society.
59 Id.
60 Id. at art. 4.
61 Id. at art. 5.
62 See supra text accompanying note 25.
63 See Convention supra note 8, at art. 3.
64 Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 58, at art. 5.
65 See supra note 54.
66 Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, 18 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 7)
at 68, U.N. Doc. A/6342 (1966).
67 Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Senegal, and Venezuela
also accepted Article 19 as originally written. See General Assembly Debate on Draft International
Covenants on Human Rights, 16 ITL ORGAN. 118 (1962). Although the American representatives
approved of article 19, the United States has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, primarily because of the article 19 and article 20 limitations on communi-
cations. This makes the American position somewhat difficult to explain-first the United
States seemed willing to accept a compromise on its freedom of information position, and
then it rejected that compromise.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 The East bloc proposed this amendment. Id. at 119.
71 India proposed that the article should merely state that everyone has the right of free
expression subject only to necessary restrictions. In this form it was felt that everyone would
agree to the article. But since this is the same wording as the Draft Convention on Freedom
of Information, the amendment failed. India, with Indonesia, also wanted to add that freedom
of information should be used "for promotion of peace and friendly relations among peoples
and nations", but that too failed. Britain felt that freedom of expression could be better
safeguarded by condemning war propaganda and extending the restriction to cover racial,
religious, and class prejudice. After some discussion, it was decided that such an addition was
out of place in Article 19 and required either a separate article or special convention. The East
bloc made one more attempt to have war propaganda and racial discrimination excluded as
subjects of freedom of speech, but the attempt failed. Id. at 118-19.
72 Article 26 of the Draft Covenant states that: "1. Any propaganda for war shall be
prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."
73 General Assembly Debate on Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, supra note 67, at 120.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Article 26 was designed to be placed immediately after article 19, so when the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted in 1966, it became article 20.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A.1 6316 (1966). Its language is identical to article
26 of the Draft Covenant. See supra note 72.
77 Se supra text accompanying notes 31-38. Like the 1936 Convention, the more recent
Declaration on Fundamental Principles also lacks effective enforcement provisions. See infra
notes 89-40 and accompanying text.
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In 1980, the UNESCO General Conference passed a resolution calling upon member states
to implement the Declaration on Fundamental Principles, and authorized the Director-Gener-
al to prepare a study on the implementation of the Declaration. Furthermore, it invited the
Director-General to convene an international conference to "further the application of the
Declaration." Application of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Con-
tribution of the Mars Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, in the
Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War,
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/20 (1980), reprinted in E. PLOMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION: A COLLECTION OF BASIC DOCUMENTS 176-77 (1982).
78 During the discussion of the proposed International Right of Correction in 1952, the
delegate from Egypt noted that the underdeveloped countries were not so much concerned
with an increased flow of news as they were interested in the accuracy of news about their
countries. See General Assembly Consideration of Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Matters: Freedom of
Information, 7 INT'L ORGAN. 82, 83-84 (1953).
79 The role of mass media in development is critical. Studies have shown that in most
developing countries, the growth of mass media outstrips the growth of the economy as a
whole. And when the mass media grows, communications systems become more national
rather than more international. See Pool, The Functions of Mass Media in International Exchange,
UNESCO HANDBOOX OF INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES, 63-64 (1965).
But when media systems first begin in an underdeveloped country, they are usually built
under the sponsorship of, and for the interests of, more developed nations. Western ideas and
information flow into the country, and the receiving country can claim that this influx causes
it to lose its cultural identity. This, briefly, is what is meant by "cultural imperialism."
Although these complaints are often perceived as peculiar to the Third World, the idea
is not new. The position of the Third World is not very different from the position of many
countries after World War II. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85. This suggests that the
problem is not so much regional or political as it is developmental. After the countries
concerned about U.S. domination after World War II developed their own communications
systems, they took their places in the East-West debate. The Third World may eventually
follow.
80 See Convention supra note 8, at art. 3.
81 Obviously, many of the Third World countries could not have been parties to the
Convention in 1936 because they did not exist.
In 1955, the U.S.S.R. proposed that the General Assembly request states which had or
might become parties to the 1936 Geneva Convention agree to transfer its'functions to the
United Nations. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.447. Since the Secretary-General had already taken over
some of these functions, the resolution was adopted. See General Assembly Consideration of Freedom
of Information and the Question of Organizing an International Code of Ethics for Information Personnel, 9 INT'L
ORGAN. 117, 119-21 (1955). Thus, the Convention still might have been enforceable.
But the Third World has preferred to help draft new agreements rather than to try to
enforce old ones.
82 See Whitton, supra note 46, at 80. The U.K., partly supporting this proposal, also argued
that states should not be obliged to publish the correction, because if more steps were taken
to encourage the free flow of information, the truth would be readily ascertained and there
would be less need for correction. Id. at 81.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 77.
85 These war-ravaged countries sought even more formal procedures to correct false
reports than the U.S. proposed. France offered a counter-proposal to the U.S. resolution
whereby U.N. machinery would be used to enforce corrections. Poland was concerned that
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there seemed to be no way under the U.S. proposal to force a country to publish the correction
sought by the wronged state. Id. at 80 and 81.
86 The Convention on The International Right of Correction, 1952, reads in relevant part:
Preamble
Considering the danger to the maintenance of friendly relations between peoples and to
the preservation of peace, arising from the publication of inaccurate reports... Considering,
however, that it is not at present practicable to institute, on the international level, a proce-
dure for verifying the accuracy of a report which might lead to the imposition of penalties
for the publication of false or distorted reports....
Considering that an effective means to these ends is to give States directly affected by a
report, which they consider false or distorted and which is disseminated by an information
agency, the possibility of securing commensurate publicity for their corrections....
Article II
A contracting State ... may submit its version of the facts (hereinafter called "com-
munique") to the Contracting States within Whose territories such despatch has been pub-
lished or disseminated. A copy of the communique shall be forwarded at the same time to
the correspondent or information agency concerned to enable that correspondent or informa-
tion agency to correct the news despatch in question....
Article III
1.... not later than five days after receiving such communique, a Contracting State
... shall:
(a) Release the communique to the correspondents and information agencies operating in
its territory through the channels customarily used for the release of news concerning inter-
national affairs for publications; and
(b) Transmit the communique to the headquarters of the information agency whose
correspondent was responsible for originating the despatch in question, if such headquarters
are within its territory.
Article IV
1. If any of the Contracting States to which a communique has been transmitted in
accordance with article II fails to fulfill, within the prescribed time-limit, the obligations laid
down in article III, the Contracting State exercising the right of correction may submit the
said communique, together with a verbatim text of the despatch as published or disseminat-
ed, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and shall at the same time notify the State
complained against that it is doing so. The latter State may, within five clear days after
receiving such notice, submit its comments to the Secretary-General, shall relate only to the
allegation that it has not discharged its obligations under article Ill.
2. The Secretary-General shall in any event, within ten clear days after receiving the
communique, give appropriate publicity through the information channels at his disposal to
the communique, together with the despatch and the comments, if any, submitted to him by
the State complained against.
The full text of the Convention is reprinted in 7 Ir'L ORcA. 179 (1953).
87 Id. at art. IV.
88 The New World Information Order provides for the regulation of international tele-
communications by addressing such issues as technical regulations concerning the use of
airwaves; the provision of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries; the control of
international propaganda; and the promotion of international understanding and world
peace.
89 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/A.3/2 (1978), reprinted in PLOMAN, supra note 77, at 172-76.
90 Id.
91 Id.
